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Abstract—This work for the first time examines the impact of
transmitter-side correlation on the artificial-noise-aided secure
transmission, based on which a new power allocation strategy
for artificial noise (AN) is devised for physical layer security
enhancement. Specifically, we design a correlation-based power
allocation (CPA) for AN, of which the optimality in terms of
achieving the minimum secrecy outage probability is analytically
proved in the large system regime with the number of transmit
antennas approaching infinity. In order to fully reveal the benefits
of the CPA, we derive easy-to-evaluate expressions for the
secrecy outage probability achieved by the CPA. Our study
demonstrates that the CPA is nearly optimal and significantly
outperforms the widely-used uniform power allocation (UPA)
even for a moderately small number of correlated transmit an-
tennas. Furthermore, our numerical results reveal a fundamental
difference between the CPA and UPA. That is when the number
of correlated transmit antennas increases, the secrecy outage
probability of the CPA always reduces while the secrecy outage
probability of the UPA suffers from a saturation point.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, transmitter-side corre-
lation, artificial noise, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Crucial concerns on the security of wireless communication
are emerging due to the fact that a large amount of confidential
information (e.g., email/bank account information and pass-
word, credit card details) is currently conveyed by the wireless
medium. Apart from the traditional cryptographic techniques,
physical layer security has recently become another key mech-
anism for safeguarding wireless communications and thus
attracted a high level of research interest due to its two
noticeable advantages [1–3]. The first one lies in the fact that
physical layer security can guarantee information secrecy re-
gardless of an eavesdropper’s computational capability, which
leads to that perfect secrecy can be achieved at the physical
layer alone. Second, physical layer security eliminates the
centralized key distribution and management requested by
cryptographic techniques, thus facilitating the management
and improving the efficiency of wireless communications. In
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pioneering studies, e.g., [5, 6], a wiretap channel was proposed
as the fundamental model of physical layer security, in which
an eavesdropper (Eve) wiretaps the wireless communication
from a transmitter (Alice) to an intended receiver (Bob).
Motivated by multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) tech-
niques, physical layer security in MIMO wiretap channels has
attracted considerable research interest in the past decade (e.g.,
[7–9]). In this context, an increasing amount of research effort
has been devoted to the artificial-noise-aided secure transmis-
sion due to its robustness and desirable performance (e.g.,
[10–17]). The utilization of artificial noise (AN) to enhance
physical layer security was proposed in [10], where the AN is
isotropically transmitted in the null space of the main channel
(i.e., the channel between Alice and Bob) in order to possibly
reduce the quality of the eavesdropper’s channel (i.e., the
channel between Alice and Eve) without causing interference
to Bob. In [11], an achievable secrecy rate was derived in a
closed-form expression, based on which the authors optimized
the power allocation between the information signal and the
AN. It was shown that equal power allocation is a near-
optimal strategy in terms of maximizing the secrecy rate.
Instead of transmitting AN isotropically, [12] considered joint
optimization of the covariance matrices of the information
signal and the AN for secrecy rate optimization. It was
shown that transmit beamforming is optimal for secrecy rate
maximization, which has been proved as optimal without using
AN in [18]. Besides transmitting AN by Alice, a full-duplex
Bob can also transmit AN in order to create interference to
Eve, and this strategy is highly desirable in some specific
practical scenarios (e.g., where Eve is close to Bob but far
from Alice) [14]. In [17], practical transmission schemes (e.g.,
on-off transmission) with AN were examined and associated
system parameters were optimized to maximize the effective
secrecy rate. Meanwhile, massive MIMO is emerging as a
key technology enabler for future 5G wireless networks, and
thus physical layer security in the context of massive MIMO
is attracting increasing research interests. For example, in
[19] the secure downlink transmission in a multicell massive
MIMO system was examined, in which two AN shaping
matrices were considered. The opportunities and challenges of
physical layer security in the context of massive MIMO were
discussed in [20], in which active pilot contamination attacks
were revealed to be difficult to detect but of high harmfulness.
A most recent work [21] investigated different precoding
strategies of data and AN in secure massive MIMO systems
and the impact of channel estimation, pilot contamination,
multicell interference, and path-loss was examined as well.
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In many practical scenarios, correlation exists among the
multiple antennas at one transceiver due to limited separa-
tion between antenna elements or poor scattering conditions.
This motivates the intensive investigation of how the antenna
correlation affects the capacity of traditional MIMO systems
without secrecy constraints (see [22] and reference therein).
For example, in [22] it was shown that the transmit antenna
correlation may increase capacity while the receive antenna
correlation always leads to capacity reduction. It was proved
in [23] that the link capacity is independent of the eigen-
vectors of correlation matrices and the capacity of a MIMO
channel with channel state information (CSI) at the receiver
increases almost surely as the number of transmit antennas
increases. However, in the context of physical layer security
the study on correlation is still in its infancy. The impact
of receiver-side correlation at Bob and Eve on the transmit
antenna selection (TAS) at Alice was investigated in wiretap
channels [24]. It was shown that the receiver-side correlation
enhances secrecy performance of TAS in the low average
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime of the main channel, but
leads to performance degradation in the medium and high
average SNR regimes [24]. Furthermore, spatial receiver-side
correlation was introduced into wiretap channels in order to
study physical layer security without knowing the number
of eavesdropper’s antennas [25]. However, the impact of the
transmitter-side correlation has never been examined in the
context of physical layer security, not to mention the AN-
aided secure transmission. This leaves an important gap in
our understanding on the performance of the AN-aided secure
transmission, and closing this gap forms the core of this work.
B. Our Main Contributions
In this work, we first detail the secure transmission with AN
in wiretap channels with transmitter-side correlation, based
on which we determine the optimal power allocation (OPA)
for AN that minimizes the secrecy outage probability as an
(Nt− 1)-dimensional numerical search problem (where Nt is
the number of antennas at Alice). Then, focusing on the large
system regime with Nt →∞ we derive a closed-form solution
to the optimal power allocation, named the correlation-based
power allocation (CPA), in which Alice allocates all the AN
power to one specific direction determined by the transmitter-
side correlation matrix and the CSI of the main channel.
We further analytically prove that the CPA maximizes the
average interference power to Eve for any finite number of
correlated transmit antennas. In order to fully understand the
benefits of our proposed CPA, we derive easy-to-evaluate
expressions for the secrecy outage probability achieved by
the CPA, based on which we determine the optimal power
allocation between the information signal and AN. Based
on the conducted analysis, we draw useful insights on the
comparison between the proposed CPA and the widely-used
uniform power allocation (UPA), in which AN is isotropically
transmitted in the null space of the main channel [10–17].
We present numerical results to characterize the secrecy
performance of the CPA with the OPA and UPA as the
benchmarks. Our results first demonstrate that a moderate level
Fig. 1. Illustration of the wiretap channel of interest where Alice is equipped
with multiple arbitrarily correlated antennas.
of antenna correlation already allows the CPA to achieve the
nearly optimal secrecy performance even with a small number
of transmit antennas. In such a situation, the CPA significantly
outperforms the UPA. Our results also reveal a fundamental
difference between the CPA and UPA. That is when the
number of correlated transmit antennas (i.e., Nt) increases,
the secrecy outage probability achieved by the CPA always
decreases, while the secrecy outage probability achieved by the
UPA suffers from a saturation point. Furthermore, our numeri-
cal studies show that the transmitter-side correlation decreases
the performance of the AN-aided secure transmission, which is
mainly due to the fact that the null space of the main channel
disappears as transmit antennas become fully correlated.
C. Paper Organization and Notation
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
tails our system model and the AN-aided secure transmission
in correlated fading channels. Section III presents the three
power allocations (i.e., OPA, CPA, and UPA), analytically
proves the optimality of the CPA in the large system regime,
and clarifies the benefits of the CPA relative to the UPA.
Section IV derives the secrecy outage probability achieved by
the CPA and optimizes the power allocation between the in-
formation signal and AN in the AN-aided secure transmission
with CPA. Section V provides numerical results to confirm our
analysis and provide useful insights on the impact of transmit
antenna correlation. Section VI draws concluding remarks.
Notations: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols.
Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case and upper-
case boldface symbols, respectively. Given a complex number
z, |z| denotes the modulus of z. Given a complex vector x,
‖x‖ denotes the Euclidean norm and x† denotes the conjugate
transpose of x. The L×L identity matrix is referred to as IL
and E[·] denotes expectation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
The wiretap channel of interest is illustrated in Fig. 1,
where Alice is equipped with Nt correlated antennas, Bob
is equipped with a single antenna, and Eve is equipped with
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a single antenna. This consideration can be justified in the
scenarios where Alice is a multi-antenna access point or
base station while both Bob and Eve are single-antenna user
terminals in the network (and Alice transmits confidential
information to Bob which should not be intercepted by Eve).
We assume that all the wireless channels within our system
model are subject to quasi-static Rayleigh fading and the
average fading power is normalized to one. Specifically, we
adopt the separable correlation model (i.e., Kronecker model)
and thus the 1 ×Nt main channel (i.e., the channel between
Alice and Bob) vector is given by [26]
h = hsT
1/2, (1)
where hs ∈ C1×Nt has independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) circularly-symmetric complex Gaussian entries (i.e.,
the entries are i.i.d circularly symmetric complex Gaussian
random variables with zero-mean and unit-variance), T is
the transmitter-side correlation matrix, and T1/2 denotes the
cholesky square root of T. We note that the transmitter-side
correlation matrix T in the Kronecker model is determined by
the signal frequency, transmitter-side antenna geometry, and
transmitter-side scattering characteristics [26–28]. As such,
in this work we assume that T is known by Alice and
the eavesdropper’s channel is subject to the same transmit
antenna correlation as the main channel. Without loss of
generality, we assume that T is a positive symmetric matrix.
Thus, its singular value decomposition (SVD) can be written
as T = UTΛU
†
T , where UT is a unitary matrix and
Λ = diag[λ1, · · · , λNt ] is the diagonal matrix with λi as
the i-th singular value of T. Then, we can rewrite (1) as
h = hs
√
ΛU
†
T , where each element of
√
Λ is the square
root of the corresponding element of Λ. We note that in most
practical scenarios, Alice will send pilots a priori or together
with data to enable the estimation of h at Bob, and then
Alice acquires the estimated CSI of the main channel through
requesting feedback from Bob. The obtained CSI may suffer
from the channel estimation and quantization errors. However,
if sufficient resources are available for the channel estimation
and feedback (e.g., transmit power and/or time slots are
enough for accurate channel estimation), these errors can be
made negligible. As such, we assume that h is perfectly known
at all transceivers in this work, since Eve may eavesdrop on
the feedback from Bob to Alice to obtain h.
Since the eavesdropper’s channel is also subject to the
transmitter-side correlation matrix T, the 1 × Nt eavesdrop-
per’s channel vector in the Kronecker model is given by
g = gsT
1/2 = gs
√
ΛU
†
T , (2)
where gs ∈ C1×Nt has i.i.d circularly-symmetric complex
Gaussian entries. We consider a passive eavesdropping sce-
nario, where Alice does not have the full knowledge of g.
B. Secure Transmission with Artificial Noise
We next detail the secure transmission with AN in the
wiretap channel of interest. In this secure transmission scheme,
Alice transmits an information signal sI in conjunction with an
(Nt−1)×1 AN signal vector sN [10–17], where sI and each
entry of sN have unit variance. We denote the total transmit
power of Alice by PA. The fraction of the power allocated to
sI is α (0 < α ≤ 1), and the remaining power (1 − α)PA is
allocated to sN . In order to transmit sI and sN , Alice designs
an Nt ×Nt beamforming matrix V given by
V = [vI VN ] , (3)
where vI ∈ CNt×1 is used to transmit sI and VN ∈
CNt×(Nt−1) is used to transmit sN . The aim of vI is to
maximize the instantaneous SNR of the main channel, and
thus we have vI = h
†
‖h‖ . Meanwhile, VN is to degrade the
quality of the eavesdropper’s channel by transmitting sN while
perfectly avoiding interference to Bob. As such, VN consists
of Nt − 1 orthonomal column vectors in the nullspace of h†.
Then, the Nt×1 transmitted signal vector at Alice, x, is given
by
x = [vI VN ]
[ √
αPA, 0
0,
√
(1−α)PA
Nt−1
√
Ω
][
sI
sN
]
=
√
αPAvIsI +
√
(1− α)PA
Nt − 1 VN
√
ΩsN , (4)
where Ω ∈ C(Nt−1)×(Nt−1) is the power allocation matrix for
sN satisfying tr(Ω) = Nt − 1.
Following (4) and noting hVN = 0, the received signal at
Bob is given by
y = hx+ nB =
√
αPAhvIsI + nB, (5)
where nB is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Bob
satisfying E[nBn†B] = σ2B . Based on (5), the instantaneous
SNR at Bob is given by
γB = αµB ‖h‖2 = αµB
Nt∑
i=1
λi|hs(i)|2, (6)
where µB = PA/σ2B . We note that γB is a function of Λ but
not a function of UT .
Following (4), the received signal at Eve is given by
z = gx+ nE
=
√
αPAgvIsI +
√
(1− α)PA
Nt − 1 gVN
√
ΩsN + nE , (7)
where nE is the AWGN at Eve satisfying E[nEn†E ] = σ2E . It is
crucial to clarify that although Eve knows h andV, she cannot
eliminate the interference caused by VNsN due to Nt > 1.
Following (7), the instantaneous SINR at Eve is given by [11]
γE = αgvI
(
1− α
Nt − 1gVNΩV
†
Ng
† +
1
µE
)−1
v
†
Ig
†, (8)
where µE = PA/σ2E . We note that γE is a function of Λ
but not of UT (the proof is similar to that of Lemma 2 in
[22] and omitted here). Noting γB is a function of Λ but
not of UT as well, we can conclude that only the singular
values of the correlation matrix T have impact on the secure
communication with AN, while the eigenvectors of T (i.e.,
UT ) have no impact.
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C. Secrecy Performance Metric
Since the CSI of the main channel is assumed to be
known by Alice, the capacity of the main channel, CB =
log2(1 + γB), is available at Alice. On the other hand, Alice
does not know the capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel,
CE = log2(1+γE), due to the fact that she cannot access the
CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel. Considering quasi-static
fading channels, we adopt the secrecy outage probability as
our key performance metric, which is defined as the probability
that the target rate of a secure transmission is larger than the
secrecy capacity. The secrecy outage probability is given by
[29]
P (Rs) = Pr(Cs<Rs) = Pr(CB −Rs<CE), (9)
where Rs is the target rate of a secure transmission and Cs =
[CB−CE ]+ is the secrecy capacity, where [x]+ = max{0, x}.
In order to facilitate the secure transmission design under a
given main channel condition, we study the secrecy outage
probability in (9) for a given CB , and this outage is solely
caused by the uncertainty of CE . We also note that if Rs ≥ CB
the main channel cannot support such a secure transmission
(i.e., the secrecy outage probability is one).
III. POWER ALLOCATION FOR ARTIFICIAL NOISE
In this section, we first present the OPA (i.e., optimal power
allocation) for AN in the secure transmission that minimizes
the secrecy outage probability in the wiretap channel with
transmitter-side correlation. Then, focusing on the large system
regime with Nt → ∞, we derive a closed-form solution to
the optimal power allocation based on the correlation matrix,
named CPA (i.e., correlation-based power allocation). In ad-
dition, we discuss the UPA (i.e., uniform power allocation)
in the wiretap channel with transmitter-side correlation as a
benchmark in this section.
A. Optimal Power Allocation
Utilizing the secrecy outage probability as the objective
function, the optimization problem of power allocation for AN
can be written as
min
Ω
P (Rs), s.t. tr(Ω) = Nt − 1. (10)
The optimization problem presented in (10) involves the
determination of (Nt − 1)2 complex entries of the power
allocation matrix Ω (i.e., 2(Nt − 1)2 real numbers), which is
of high complexity. We have the following lemma to simplify
(10) as a (Nt−1)-dimensional numerical search problem. For
the sake of clear presentation, we define a positive definite
Hermitian matrix as
Q = V†NTVN , (11)
and its SVD can be written as
Q =WΘW†, (12)
where W is a unitary matrix and Θ = diag[θ1, . . . , θNt−1] is
the diagonal matrix with θm as the m-th singular value of Q
with θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θNt−1. We now present Lemma 1 based
on the SVD of Q.
Lemma 1: The optimization problem presented in (10) can
be simplified as
min
Φ
P (Rs),
s.t. Ω =WΦW†, tr(Φ) = Nt − 1,
Φ = diag [φ1, φ2, . . . , φNt−1] ,
(13)
where φ1, φ2, . . . , φNt−1 are non-negative real numbers.
Proof: We note that the selection ofΩ affects P (Rs) only
through gVNΩV†Ng† involved in γE given in (8). Based on
the definition of g given in (2), we have V†Ng† ∼ CN (0,Q).
Then we know that gVNW has i.i.d circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian entries. As proved in [30, Theorem 1 and
Lemma 1], gVNWΦW†V†Ng† is equal in distribution to
gVNΩV
†
Ng
† for general Φ and Ω. This completes the proof
of Lemma 1.
We note that the optimization problem presented in (13) is
much less complex than that provided in (10). This is due
to the fact that in (10) there are 2(Nt − 1)2 real numbers to
determine for Ω while we only have to determine Nt − 1
real numbers for Φ in (13). We also note that analytical
solution to (13) is still mathematically intractable. This is
mainly due to the fact that P (Rs) cannot be derived in a
closed-form expression for a general Φ. The difficulty lies in
the fact that gVNWΦW†V†Ng† and |gvI |2 are correlated
in the expression of γE given in (8), which leads to that
the probability density function (pdf) of γE is mathematically
intractable. Therefore, the optimization problem given in (13)
can only be solved through numerical simulations, which is of
high complexity and time-consuming for large Nt. As such,
in the following we develop a sub-optimal but much simpler
power allocation, and analytically prove its optimality in the
large system regime with Nt →∞.
B. Correlation-Based Power Allocation
Now, we propose the CPA, which is optimal in terms of
minimizing P (Rs) in the large system regime with Nt →∞,
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: As Nt → ∞, the optimal solution to Ω that
minimizes P (Rs) is given by
Ω∗ = (Nt − 1)wIw†I , (14)
where wI is the principal eigenvector corresponding to the
largest singular value of Q (i.e., Ω∗ = WΦ∗W† and Φ∗ =
diag[Nt − 1, 0, . . . , 0]).
Proof: Due to the distance concentration phenomenon
[31], when Nt → ∞ both |gvI |2 and ‖gVNW
√
Φ‖2 in-
volved in γE approach their mean values. We note that the
mean of ‖gVNW
√
Φ‖2 is positive and µE ≥ 0. As such,
we can conclude that γE approaches its mean as Nt → ∞
based on the quotient rule for limits, which states that the
limit of a quotient of two functions is the quotient of their
limits, provided the limit of the denominator is not zero [32]. It
follows that the minimization of the secrecy outage probability
P (Rs) is equivalent to minimizing the mean of γE . We note
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that Φ only varies the value of ‖gVNW
√
Φ‖2 (i.e., |gvI |2 is
not a function of Φ). Therefore, Φ is to maximize the mean
of ‖gVNW
√
Φ‖2 in order to minimize P (Rs) as per the
expression of γE given in (8). As mentioned in the proof of
Lemma 1, gVNW has i.i.d entries, and thus we have
‖gVNW
√
Φ‖2 =
Nt−1∑
m=1
φmθm|gI(m)|2, (15)
where gI = gVNW(
√
Θ)−1 has i.i.d circularly-symmetric
complex Gaussian entries with unit variance. Then, the mean
of ‖gVNW
√
Φ‖2 is given by
E
[
‖gVNW
√
Φ‖2
]
=
Nt−1∑
m=1
φmθm. (16)
Noting θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θNt−1, in order to maximize
E[‖gVNW
√
Ω‖2] subject to tr(Φ) = Nt− 1 (i.e., φ1 +φ2 +
· · ·+φNt−1 = Nt−1), we have to set φ∗1 = Nt−1 and φ∗k = 0
for k = 2, 3, . . . , Nt − 1 (i.e., Φ∗ = diag[Nt − 1, 0, . . . , 0]).
We note that for Φ∗ = diag[Nt − 1, 0, . . . , 0] we have
Ω∗ = WΦ∗W† = (Nt−1)wIw†I . This completes the proof
of Theorem 1.
We note that the CPA allocates all the AN power to the
direction corresponding to the largest singular value of Q,
which is similar to the beamforming strategy based on Q. The
intuitive meaning of the CPA is that Alice first maps the Nt-
dimensional eavesdropper’s channel vector into the (Nt − 1)-
dimensional nullspace of the main channel by applying VN
and then transmits AN along the average strongest direction
of the effective eavesdropper’s channel vector gVN . This is
due to the fact that Q = V†NTVN is the covariance matrix
of gVN and thus wI corresponds to the average strongest
direction of gVN . We also note that this is the first work
studying the impact of transmitter-side correlation on the
design of secure transmission. As such, we focus more on
the transmitter side and considered a simple baseline model
for receivers, in which Bob and Eve are both single-antenna
devices. Moreover, we clarify that our Theorem 1 is still valid
when Eve is equipped with multiple (i.e., Ne) uncorrelated
antennas.
The following corollary states another important property
of the CPA.
Corollary 1: The CPA (i.e., Ω∗ = (Nt−1)wI ) achieves
the maximum average interference to Eve for all values of
Nt, which is given by
E
[
|gVN
√
Ω∗|2
]
= (Nt − 1)θ1. (17)
Proof: Based on Lemma 1, we know that
E[‖gVN
√
Ω‖2] = E[‖gVNW
√
Φ‖2]. Then, based on
the discussion after (16) in the proof of Theorem 1 we can
conclude that the CPA maximizes the average interference to
Eve (i.e., maximizes E[‖gVN
√
Ω‖2]). Finally, substituting
Ω∗ = WΦ∗W† = (Nt−1)wIw†I into (16) we achieve the
result given in (17).
As per Theorem 1, the instantaneous SINR at Eve of the
CPA for a given α is given by
γE =
αµE |gvI |2
(1− α)µE |gVNwI |2 + 1 . (18)
C. Uniform Power Allocation
In this subsection, we present the UPA as a benchmark to
clarify the benefits of our proposed CPA. In the UPA, Alice
isotropically allocates the transmit power for the AN among
all entries of sN , i.e., Ω = INt−1. Following (8), the SINR at
Eve of the UPA for a given α is given by [17]
γuE =
αµE |gvI |2
(1−α)µE
Nt−1 ‖gVN‖2 + 1
. (19)
Following a similar procedure for obtaining (15), we have
‖gVN‖2 =
Nt−1∑
m=1
θm|gI(m)|2. (20)
Then, the average interference to Eve achieved by the UPA is
given by
E
[‖gVN‖2] = Nt−1∑
m=1
θm. (21)
We note that the UPA is widely adopted in the literature in
wiretap channels without correlation. This is due to the fact
that Alice cannot access the CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel
and has no information on g other than its distribution. With
regard to the comparison between the UPA and CPA, we have
the following remarks.
• The UPA maximizes the average interference to Eve in
wiretap channels without correlation (i.e., E[‖gVN‖2] ≥
E[gVNΩV
†
Ng
†] when T = INt ). We note that our pro-
posed CPA achieves the same average interference to Eve
as the UPA when T = INt (i.e., (Nt−1)θ1 =
∑Nt−1
m=1 θm
when T = INt due to θ1 = θ2 = · · · = θNt−1 for
T = INt).
• Comparing (17) and (21) we can see that the CPA leads
to a larger average interference to Eve than the UPA in
wiretap channels with transmitter-side correlation. This is
due to θ1 ≥ θ2 ≥ · · · ≥ θNt−1, which leads to (Nt −
1)θ1 ≥
∑Nt−1
m=1 θm.
• Following the proof of Theorem 1, we know that as
Nt → ∞, these average interferences to Eve of the
CPA and UPA as given in (17) and (21), respectively,
determine the secrecy outage probabilities of the CPA
and UPA, respectively. As such, we can conclude that in
the large system regime with Nt →∞, the CPA leads to
a lower P (Rs) relative to the UPA in wiretap channels
with transmitter-side correlation.
• The gap between θ1 and 1Nt−1
∑Nt−1
m=1 θm increases as the
correlation becomes more severe. As such, our proposed
CPA is more desirable in wiretap channels with high
transmitter-side correlation.
IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE
CORRELATION-BASED POWER ALLOCATION
In this section we analyze the secrecy performance of the
AN-aided secure transmission with CPA in order to fully
understand the benefits of the proposed CPA for AN. As men-
tioned in Section II-C, we study the secrecy outage probability
for a given main channel realization in order to facilitate the
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channel-dependent transmission design. Specifically, we derive
easy-to-evaluate expressions for the secrecy outage probabili-
ties of the CPA. Based on these expressions, we determine the
optimal power allocation between the information signal and
the AN. We note that in practice we may not be able to know
the receiver noise level at Eve (i.e., σ2E ), and thus we first
derive the secrecy outage probability for σ2E = 0 (referred to
as the asymptotic secrecy outage probability) and then derive
the secrecy outage probability for arbitrary known values of
σ2E with σ2E > 0 (referred to as the exact secrecy outage
probability). We would like to clarify that the asymptotic
secrecy outage probability is not a special case of the exact
secrecy outage probability.
A. Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability
For σ2E = 0 (i.e., µE → ∞) , following (18) the SINR at
Eve is given by
γ∞E =
α|gvI |2
(1− α)|gVNwI |2 . (22)
We next derive the asymptotic secrecy outage probability
achieved by the CPA for σ2E = 0 in the following theorem.
We note that we have α < 1 for σ2E = 0 in order to guarantee
the asymptotic secrecy outage probability to be less than one
(i.e., the asymptotic secrecy outage probability equals one for
α = 1).
Theorem 2: The asymptotic secrecy outage probability
achieved by the CPA is given by
P∞(Rs) = 1−σ
2
n(1−ρ)
σ2d
∞∑
k=0
(2k+1)!σ2kn ρ
k
(k!)2σ2kd
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)(−σ2n
σ2
d
)k−i
i−2k−1
×
[(
γB + 1
2Rs
− 1 + σ
2
n
σ2d
)i−2k−1
−
(
σ2n
σ2d
)i−2k−1]
,
(23)
where
ρ =
α(1 − α)|v†ITVNwI |2
4σ2nσ
2
d
, (24)
σn =
√
α
2
v
†
ITvI , (25)
σd =
√
1− α
2
w
†
IV
†
NTVNwI . (26)
Proof: Following (9), the asymptotic secrecy outage prob-
ability of the CPA is given by
P∞(Rs) = Pr
(
γ∞E >
γB+1
2Rs
−1
)
= 1−Fγ∞
E
(
γB+1
2Rs
−1
)
,
(27)
where Fγ∞
E
(·) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of
γ∞E . In order to derive the expression of P∞(Rs), we next
derive Fγ∞
E
(·). We can rewrite γ∞E as γ∞E = χn/χd, where
χn = α|gvI |2, (28)
χd = (1 − α)|gVNwI |2. (29)
The correlation coefficient between χn and χd is ρ. We note
that ρ = 0 if T = INt (i.e., uncorrelated fading channels)
due to the fact that vI and VN are orthogonal. We also
note that vI , VN , and wI are known and deterministic since
the CSI of the main channel h and the correlation matrix
T are assumed to be fixed and known. As such, gvI and
gVNwI are both complex Gaussian random variables (for
given deterministic vI , VN , and wI ), which leads to that χn
and χd are independent when ρ = 0. We next focus on the
case where ρ 6= 0 since we are interested in correlated fading
channels in this work. Again, since gvI and gVNwI are both
complex Gaussian random variables (for given deterministic
vI , VN , and wI ) , the joint pdf of χn and χd is given by
[34]
fχn,χd(x, y) =
e
− 1
2(1−ρ)
(
x
σ2n
+ y
σ2
d
)
4σ2nσ
2
d(1− ρ)
I0
( √
ρ
1− ρ
√
xy
σnσd
)
, (30)
where I0(·) is the zero-order modified Bessel function of the
first kind, which can be expanded as
I0(t) =
∞∑
k=0
t2k
22k(k!)2
. (31)
Then, the pdf of γ∞E is derived as
fγ∞
E
(z) =
∫ ∞
0
yfχn,χd(zy, y)dy
a
=
1
4σ2nσ
2
d(1− ρ)
∞∑
k=0
( √
ρ
1−ρ
√
z
σnσd
)2k
22k(k!)2
×
∫ ∞
0
y2k+1e
− 1
2(1−ρ)
(
z
σ2n
+ 1
σ2
d
)
y
dy
b
=
1
4σ2nσ
2
d(1− ρ)
∞∑
k=0
( √
ρ
1−ρ
√
z
σnσd
)2k
22k(k!)2
× (2k + 1)!
[
1
2(1− ρ)
(
z
σ2n
+
1
σ2d
)]−(2k+2)
=
σ2n(1− ρ)
σ2d
∞∑
k=0
(2k + 1)!σ2kn ρ
k
(k!)2σ2kd
zk(
z +
σ2n
σ2
d
)2k+2 ,
(32)
where a= is achieved by substituting (31) into (30) and b= is
obtained based on the following identify [35, Eq. (3.351.3)]∫ ∞
0
xne−τxdx = n!τ−n−1. (33)
Then, following (32) the cdf of γ∞E can be derived as
Fγ∞
E
(z) =
∫ z
0
fγ∞
E
(x)dx
c
=
σ2n(1 − ρ)
σ2d
∞∑
k=0
(2k + 1)!σ2kn ρ
k
(k!)2σ2kd
×
∫ z+σ2n
σ2
d
σ2n
σ2
d
y−(2k+2)
(
y − σ
2
n
σ2d
)k
dy
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d
=
σ2n(1−ρ)
σ2d
∞∑
k=0
(2k + 1)!σ2kn ρ
k
(k!)2σ2kd
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
) (−σ2n
σ2
d
)k−i
i− 2k − 1
×
[(
z +
σ2n
σ2d
)i−2k−1
−
(
σ2n
σ2d
)i−2k−1]
, (34)
where c= is achieved by exchanging variables (i.e., setting
y = x+ σ2n/σ
2
d) and
d
= is obtained by applying the following
identity [35, Eq. (1.111)]
(x− t)n =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
xi(−t)n−i. (35)
Then, the secrecy outage probability given in (23) is achieved
by substituting (34) into (27).
We note that although the expression of the secrecy outage
probability given in (23) involves an infinite series (i.e.,∑∞
k=0), it can be approximated by its finite truncation accu-
rately (e.g., utilizing the first K terms, ∑Kk=0, as an approxi-
mation of
∑∞
k=0). This is due to the fact that (23) is convergent
since the infinite series involved in (23) arises from the series
expansion of the zero-order modified Bessel function of the
first kind given in (31), which is convergent.
B. Exact Secrecy Outage Probability
In some scenarios, the receiver noise level at Eve (i.e., σ2E )
is possible to be known by Alice. For example, Eve could
be a normal user served by Alice, but secure communication
between Alice and Bob is requested while treating Eve as an
eavesdropper. As such, in this subsection we derive the exact
secrecy outage probability achieved by the CPA for σ2E > 0,
which is presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The exact secrecy outage probability achieved
by the CPA is given by
P (Rs) =

 e−
γB+1
2Rs
−1
µEv
†
I
TvI , α = 1,
Pαso(Rs), 0 < α < 1,
(36)
where
Pαso(Rs) = 1−
e
1
2(1−ρ)s2
d
4s2ns
2
d(1− ρ)
∞∑
k=0
ρk(1−ρ)−k
2k(k!)2s2kd
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(−1)i−k
×
k+i+1∑
j=0
(k + i+ 1)!
j! [2(1−ρ)s2n]j−i−2
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)(
−s
2
n
s2d
)k−m
×
[
̥
(
k + i−j−m+1, 1
2(1−ρ)s2n
,
γB+1
2Rs
−1 + s
2
n
s2d
)
−̥
(
k + i−j−m+1, 1
2(1−ρ)s2n
,
s2n
s2d
)]
, (37)
sn =
√
αµE
2
v
†
ITvI , (38)
sd =
√
(1− α)µE
2
w
†
IV
†
NTVNwI , (39)
̥(n, p, x)=


pnγ (−n, px) , n < 0,
Ei(−px), n = 0,
pnEi(−px)
n!(−1)n −e
−px
xn
∑n−1
k=0
(−1)kpkxk
n(n−1)...(n−k) , n > 0,
(40)
γ(·, ·) is the incomplete gamma function, and Ei(·) is the
exponential integral function.
Proof: Following (9), the exact secrecy outage probability
of the CPA is given by
P (Rs) = Pr
(
γE>
γB+1
2Rs
−1
)
= 1−FγE
(
γB+1
2Rs
−1
)
,
(41)
where FγE (·) is the cdf of γE . In order to derive the expression
of P (Rs), we next derive FγE (·). We can rewrite γE as γE =
ψn/ψd, where
ψn = αµE |gvI |2, (42)
ψd = (1− α)µE |gVNwI |2 + 1. (43)
When α = 1, γE = µE |gvI |2, and thus the cdf of γE for
α = 1 is given by
FγE (z) = 1− e
− z
µEv
†
I
TvI . (44)
As such, P (Rs) for α = 1 is derived as given in (36). We
note that gvI and gVNwI are both complex Gaussian random
variables (for given deterministic vI , VN , and wI ). As such,
for 0 < α < 1 the joint pdf of ψn and ψd is given by [34]
fψn,ψd(x, y) =
e
− 1
2(1−ρ)
(
x
s2n
+ y−1
s2
d
)
4s2ns
2
d(1− ρ)
I0
( √
ρ
1− ρ
√
x(y − 1)
snsd
)
.
(45)
Then, the pdf of γE for 0 < α < 1 is derived as
fγE(z) =
∫ ∞
0
yfψn,ψd(zy, y)dy
e
=
e
1
2(1−ρ)s2
d
4s2ns
2
d(1− ρ)
∞∑
k=0
( √
ρ
1−ρ
√
z
snsd
)2k
22k(k!)2
×
∫ ∞
1
yk+1(y − 1)ke−
1
2(1−ρ)
(
z
s2n
+ 1
s2
d
)
y
dy
f
=
e
1
2(1−ρ)s2
d
4s2ns
2
d(1− ρ)
∞∑
k=0
( √
ρ
1−ρ
√
z
snsd
)2k
22k(k!)2
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(−1)k−i
×
∫ ∞
1
yk+i+1e
− 1
2(1−ρ)
(
z
s2n
+ 1
s2
d
)
y
dy
g
=
e
1
2(1−ρ)s2
d
4s2ns
2
d(1− ρ)
∞∑
k=0
( √
ρ
1−ρ
√
z
snsd
)2k
22k(k!)2
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(−1)i−k
×
k+i+1∑
j=0
(k + i+ 1)!
j!
e
− 12(1−ρ)
(
z
s2n
+ 1
s2
d
)
[
1
2(1−ρ)
(
z
s2n
+ 1
s2
d
)]k+i−j+2 ,
(46)
where e= is achieved by noting ψd ∈ [1,∞), f= is obtained
by applying (35), and g= is gained by utilizing the following
identify ∫ ∞
1
xne−τxdx = e−τ
n∑
j=0
n!
j!
τ−n−j+1. (47)
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Following (46), the cdf of γE for 0 < α < 1 is derived as
FγE (z) =
∫ z
0
fγE(x)dx
=
e
1
2(1−ρ)s2
d
4s2ns
2
d(1− ρ)
∞∑
k=0
ρk(1−ρ)−k
2k(k!)2s2kd
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(−1)i−k
×
k+i+1∑
j=0
(k + i+ 1)!
j! [2(1−ρ)s2n]j−i−2
×
∫ z
0
xk
(
x+
s2n
s2d
)−(k+i−j+2)
e
− 1
2(1−ρ)s2n
(
x+
s2n
s2
d
)
dx
h
=
e
1
2(1−ρ)s2
d
4s2ns
2
d(1− ρ)
∞∑
k=0
ρk(1−ρ)−k
2k(k!)2s2kd
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(−1)i−k
×
k+i+1∑
j=0
(k + i+ 1)!
j! [2(1−ρ)s2n]j−i−2
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)(
−s
2
n
s2d
)k−m
×
∫ z+ s2n
s2
d
s2n
s2
d
ym−k−i+j−2e
− 1
2(1−ρ)s2n
y
dy
i
=
e
1
2(1−ρ)s2
d
4s2ns
2
d(1− ρ)
∞∑
k=0
ρk(1−ρ)−k
2k(k!)2s2kd
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(−1)i−k
×
k+i+1∑
j=0
(k + i+ 1)!
j! [2(1−ρ)s2n]j−i−2
k∑
m=0
(
k
m
)(
−s
2
n
s2d
)k−m
×
[
̥
(
k + i−j−m+1, 1
2(1−ρ)s2n
, z +
s2n
s2d
)
−̥
(
k + i−j−m+1, 1
2(1−ρ)s2n
,
s2n
s2d
)]
, (48)
where the incomplete gamma function γ(·, ·) is given by
γ(n, x) =
∫ x
0
e−ttn−1dt, (49)
and the exponential integral function Ei(·) is given by
Ei(x) = −
∫ ∞
−x
e−t
t
dt =
∫ x
−∞
et
t
dt, [x < 0]. (50)
We note that h= in (48) is achieved by exchanging random
variable (i.e., y = x+ s2n/s2d) and
i
= is gained with the aid of
the following two identities∫ τ
0
xne−pxdx = p−n−1γ(n+ 1, pτ), [n ≥ 0], (51)
∫ ∞
τ
e−pxdx
xn+1
=
pnEi(−pτ)
n!(−1)n+1−
e−pτ
τn
n−1∑
k=0
(−1)kpkτk
n(n−1) . . . (n−k) ,
[n > 0]. (52)
Then, the secrecy outage probability given in (37) is achieved
by substituting (48) into (41).
Comparing (36) and (23), we know that the expression for
the exact secrecy outage probability is much more complicated
than that for the asymptotic secrecy outage probability. Similar
to (23), the infinite series involved in (37) can be approximated
by its finite truncation accurately due to the convergence of
this infinite series. As per (36), we can draw the conclusion
that when α = 1 the exact secrecy outage probability averaged
over all realizations of h increases as the correlation becomes
more severe. This is due to the following two facts. Firstly,
based on (6) the average value of γB does not vary with the
correlation matrix T. Secondly, v†ITv
†
I increases on average
as the correlation becomes more severe due to the fact that
if h†shs = INt we have v
†
ITv
†
I = λ1 and λ1 increases
as the correlation becomes more severe. The detrimental
effect of correlation can be intuitively understood as follows.
As correlation increases, the eavesdropper’s channel becomes
more aligned with the main channel and thus the SNR at Eve
improves in the absence of AN (since α = 1). As we will
confirmed later in Section V, this conclusion also holds with
AN, i.e., when α is optimized.
C. Optimization of the Power Allocation Parameter α
In order to guarantee the secrecy outage probability of a
secure transmission is less than one, we have to guarantee
CB > Rs. As such, the lower bound on the power allocation
parameter α is given by
αl =
2Rs − 1
µB‖h‖2 . (53)
The optimal value of power allocation parameter α that
minimizes the asymptotic secrecy outage probability given in
(23) can be obtained through
α∗∞ = argmin
αl<α<1
P∞(Rs), (54)
and we denote P ∗∞(Rs) as the minimum asymptotic secrecy
outage probability achieved by setting α = α∗∞ in the
asymptotic secrecy outage probability P∞(Rs).
The optimal value of power allocation parameter α that
minimizes the exact secrecy outage probability given in (36)
can be obtained through
α∗ = argmin
αl<α≤1
P (Rs), (55)
and we denote P ∗(Rs) as the minimum exact secrecy outage
probability achieved by setting α = α∗ in the exact secrecy
outage probability P (Rs) .
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first provide numerical comparison
among the OPA, CPA, and UPA, based on which we observe
that our proposed CPA is nearly optimal in terms of mini-
mizing the secrecy outage probability even for finite Nt. We
also examine the impact of transmitter-side correlation on the
AN-aided secure transmission. Finally, based on our numerical
studies we draw useful insights on the effect of system
parameters (e.g., Nt) on the AN-aided secure transmission
with different power allocations.
In Fig. 2 we plot the asymptotic (i.e., for µE → ∞)
and exact (i.e., for µE = 5 dB) secrecy outage probabilities
of the AN-aided secure transmission with OPA, CPA, and
UPA. In this figure we first observe that the theoretic secrecy
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probabilities of the AN-aided secure transmission with
OPA, CPA, and UPA versus different values of α for Nt = 4, Rs = 2, µB =
5 dB, Λ = diag[2.8, 0.7, 0.3, 0.2], and hs = [0.1104−0.6619i,−0.6677 +
1.2432i, 0.7588 + 0.9201i, 1.0196 + 0.4098i].
outage probabilities achieved by the CPA precisely match its
simulated secrecy outage probabilities. This confirms the cor-
rectness of the results presented in Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
We note that in the calculation of our theoretic secrecy outage
probabilities (i.e., P∞(Rs) and P (Rs)) we truncate the infinite
series
∑∞
k=0 at k = 15. As such, the exact match between
the theoretic and simulated secrecy outage probabilities as
shown in this figure also indicates that the theoretic P∞(Rs)
and P (Rs) can be approximated accurately by closed-form
expressions (i.e., the involved infinite series can be accurately
approximated by a finite series). Surprisingly, we also observe
that our proposed CPA achieves almost identical secrecy
outage probabilities as the OPA, which demonstrates that
the proposed CPA is nearly optimal in terms of minimizing
the secrecy outage probability under the adopted specific
simulation settings (which are detailed in the caption of this
figure1). Noting Nt = 4 for Fig. 2, we can conclude that our
proposed CPA is nearly optimal even for a finite number of
transmit antennas with moderate correlation. We note that as
we have proved in Theorem 1 the CPA is optimal in the large
system regime with Nt →∞. In this figure, we also observe
that the proposed CPA achieves much lower secrecy outage
probabilities than the UPA, which shows one advantage of the
CPA relative to the UPA. Finally, we note that the optimal
value of α that minimizes the secrecy outage probability for
the CPA is smaller than that for the UPA (for µE → ∞ the
gap is tiny, but when µE is finite, e.g., µE = 5 dB, this gap
is noticeable). This is mainly due to the fact that under the
specific system settings the CPA utilizes AN more efficiently
relative to the UPA (i.e., by using the same transmit power of
AN, the CPA leads to more interference to Eve on average than
1As we mentioned in Section II-B, UT does not affect the performance
of the AN-aided secure transmission. Thus, we only presented the adopted Λ
for this figure.
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Fig. 3. Minimum secrecy outage probabilities achieved by the CPA versus
different values of µE for Nt = 3, L = 0.5m (i.e., δ1,2 = δ2,3 = 0.25m
and δ1,3 = 0.5m), Rs = 1, µB = 10 dB, and hs = [0.0234 +
0.2351i,−0.0788−0.4619i,−0.5344 + 1.0582i].
the UPA). For µE →∞, the optimal values of α are already
low (considerable transmit power is allocated to AN) and thus
the gap is relatively minor. For finite µE , the optimal values
of α are relatively high and thus the gap becomes noticeable.
In Fig. 3 we plot the minimum asymptotic and exact secrecy
outage probabilities of the CPA (i.e., P ∗∞(Rs) and P ∗(Rs))
versus different values of µE . Although our analysis is valid
for an arbitrary correlation matrix, in this figure and the
following figures we adopt an exponential correlation model,
in which the (i, j)-th entry of T is given by tij = ρδijr ,
where ρr ∈ [0, 1] is the correlation parameter specified by
system settings (e.g., signal frequency) and δij is the distance
between the i-th and j-th antennas at Alice. We note that a
larger ρr indicates a larger correlation for a fixed δij , where
ρr = 0 serves as the uncorrelated case and ρr = 1 represents
the fully correlated case. We also adopt the uniform linear
array as Alice’s antenna configuration and the array length is
denoted as L in this figure and the following figures. In this
figure we first observe that P ∗(Rs) approaches P ∗∞(Rs) as
µE increases and they are almost equal when µE ≥ 20 dB.
This demonstrates that P ∗∞(Rs) can be a good approximation
of P ∗(Rs) even for a finite µE (e.g., 20 dB). We also observe
that for the adopted hs, both P ∗∞(Rs) and P ∗(Rs) increase as
ρr increases, which means that the secrecy performance of the
CPA decreases as the correlation of transmit antennas becomes
more severe. This is mainly caused by the fact that as the corre-
lation increases the null space of the main channel shrinks. As
this null space shrinks, the probability that the eavesdropper’s
channel lies in the null space decreases. As such, transmitting
AN in the null space leads to less interference to Eve on
average as the correlation increases. We note that as the
transmit antenna correlation increases the statistical CSI can
better represent the instantaneous CSI [36]. As we assume
the statistical information on the eavesdropper’s channel is
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Fig. 4. Minimum asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities achieved by the
OPA, CPA, and UPA versus different values of ρr for Nt = 3, L = 0.5m,
Rs = 1, µB = 10 dB, and (a) hs = [−0.1470 + 0.1876i,−0.3905 +
1.0675i,−0.5091 − 0.8150i], (b) hs = [−0.0845 + 0.5064i, 0.1612 +
0.0330i,−0.7529 + 0.0282i].
known, the increase in the correlation offers more information
on the instantaneous eavesdropper’s channel. This seems to
be in contradiction with the observation that both P ∗∞(Rs)
and P ∗(Rs) increase as ρr increases. The main reason is that
the additional information offered by the increased correlation
cannot counteract the decay in the null space of the main
channel. We will further examine the impact of the transmitter-
side correlation on the performance of the CPA in Fig. 4 and
Fig. 5, in which we will see that the increased correlation may
decrease the secrecy outage probability of the CPA.
In Fig. 4 we plot the minimum asymptotic secrecy outage
probabilities achieved by the UPA, CPA, and OPA versus
different values of ρr. In Fig. 4 (a) for the specific adopted hs
we observe that all the three minimum asymptotic secrecy
outage probabilities increase as ρr increases. This is due
to the fact that as ρr → 1 the null space of the main
channel disappears and Alice cannot create interference to Eve
while perfectly avoid the interference to Bob. In Fig. 4 (b)
for the specific adopted hs we observe that the minimum
asymptotic secrecy outage probability achieved by the CPA
first decreases and then increases as ρr increases. This initial
decrease can be explained by the fact that the initial increase
in the correlation (i.e., ρr) offers useful information of the
eavesdropper’s channel while does not significantly affect the
null space of the specific hs, which leads to the reduction
in the secrecy outage probability. The following increase in
the minimum asymptotic secrecy outage probability achieved
by the CPA can be explained by the fact that the offered
information on the eavesdropper’s channel by the increase in
ρr cannot counteract the decay of the null space caused by
the increase in ρr. We conducted hundreds of simulations for
different realizations of hs and all the results are similar to
either Fig. 4 (a) or Fig. 4 (b). In both Fig. 4 (a) and Fig. 4 (b)
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Fig. 5. Expected minimum exact secrecy outage probabilities achieved by
the CPA and UPA versus different values of µB for Nt = 3, L = 0.5m,
Rs = 1, µE = 5 dB.
we also observe that the minimum asymptotic secrecy outage
probability achieved by the CPA is lower than that achieved
by the UPA when ρr is larger than some specific value, which
only corresponds to a small correlation.
As we mentioned in Section II-C, we have focused on the
secrecy outage probability for a given main channel realization
in order to study the AN power allocation design based on
a given main channel realization. Now, we also present the
secrecy outage probability averaged over all main channel
realizations. In Fig. 5 we plot the average minimum exact
secrecy outage probabilities achieved by the CPA and UPA,
which are obtained through averaging the minimum exact
secrecy outage probabilities over h obtained by the CPA and
UPA, respectively. As expected, in this figure we first observe
that the average minimum exact secrecy outage probability
achieved by the CPA is higher than that achieved by the UPA
for the uncorrelated case (i.e., ρr = 0). This is due to the
fact that for ρr = 0 the variance of the interference to Eve
for the CPA is larger than that for the UPA while the mean
of the interference to Eve for these two power allocations is
the same. We also observe that the average minimum exact
secrecy outage probability achieved by the CPA is lower than
that achieved by the UPA for the most of the correlated cases
(e.g., for ρr ≥ 0.2). This can be explained by the fact that on
average the CPA leads to a much larger average interference to
Eve relative to the UPA. The aforementioned two observations
again demonstrate that our proposed CPA can outperform the
UPA in correlated fading channels. Finally, as expected we
observe that both these two average minimum exact secrecy
outage probabilities decrease as µB increases, which caused
by the increasing quality of the main channel.
Continuing with Fig. 5, we plot the average minimum
asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities achieved by the CPA
and UPA versus different values of Nt for fixed array length
L in Fig. 6 (Alice is equipped with uniform linear array with
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Fig. 6. Average minimum asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities achieved
by the CPA and UPA versus different values of Nt for L = 0.5m, Rs = 1,
µB = 10 dB, and µE = 5 dB.
Nt elements and the array length is L). In this figure, we
first observe that the average minimum asymptotic secrecy
outage probability achieved by the UPA first decreases and
then keeps nearly constant as Nt increases. This indicates that
Nt suffers from a saturation point in improving the secrecy
performance of the UPA, which can be explained by the fact
that as Nt increases for a fixed L the correlation among
these transmit antennas becomes stronger. On the contrary, we
observe that the average minimum asymptotic secrecy outage
probability achieved by the CPA continuously decreases as Nt
increases without such a saturation point. This demonstrates
another advantage of our proposed CPA relative to the UPA,
which is that when Nt is large the CPA outperforms the
UPA even in the wiretap channel with very low transmitter-
side correlation. This advantage is confirmed by the obser-
vation that the average minimum asymptotic secrecy outage
probability achieved by the CPA becomes lower than that
achieved by the UPA for ρr = 0.05 when Nt is larger than
21. Also, this observation can be explained by our Theorem 1,
in which we have proved that the CPA is optimal in the large
system-regime. Finally, we observe that the gap between these
two average minimum asymptotic secrecy outage probabilities
increases as Nt increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we devised the CPA for AN in the wire-
tap channel with transmitter-side correlation and theoretically
proved its optimality in terms of achieving the minimum
secrecy outage probability in the large system regime with
Nt → ∞. Our analysis showed that the proposed CPA max-
imizes the average interference to Eve for arbitrary Nt. The
asymptotic and exact secrecy outage probabilities of the CPA
for arbitrary Nt were derived in easy-to-evaluate expressions,
based on which we optimized the power allocation between the
information signal and AN in the AN-aided secure transmis-
sion with CPA. The conducted numerical results demonstrated
that the CPA is nearly optimal and significantly outperforms
the UPA even for finite Nt in the wiretap channel with
transmitter-side correlation. Our study also revealed that the
secrecy outage probability achieved by the UPA suffers from
a saturation point as Nt increases while the secrecy outage
probability obtained by our proposed CPA does not.
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